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Case No. 20080551-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
BRANDON LEE MORRIS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court plainly err when it did not sua sponte enter a directed 
verdict? 
Standard of Review. "To show that plain error occurred in the context of a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime [s] charged and second 
that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, If 32,55 P.3d 1131 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10 P.3d 346). 
2. Was counsel ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict? 
Standard of Review. "'An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law/" which the appellate court 
"review[s] for correctness/' State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, f 10,169 P.3d 806 
(quoting State v. Clark 2004 UT 25, | 6, 89 P.3d 162). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 764-601 (West Supp. 2008) (definitions) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008) (aggravated kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004) (robbery) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count each of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302 (West Supp. 2008). Rl-2. A jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. R56-
57. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of 
five years to life on the aggravated robbery count and fifteen years to life on the 
aggravated kidnapping count. R115-16. 
Defendant timely appealed. R118. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
John Barlow met Christina Briggs in mid-July 2007. R134:163. Their 
relationship became intimate, and they lived together for a few days. R134:165-66. 
After Mr. Barlow moved out, they continued to send text messages to one another. 
R134:166. 
On September 8, 2007, Ms. Briggs sent Mr. Barlow a text message, and they 
decided to spend the afternoon together, driving up Ogden Canyon, looping over to 
Park City and down through Provo Canyon, and finally traveling up to a barbecue 
in Sandy. R134:167. Ms. Briggs proposed that they meet at the Timbermine 
Restaurant at the mouth of Ogden Canyon. R134:167-69. 
Mr. Barlow, driving a van, met her in the parking lot. R134:170. He was 
surprised to find that Ms. Briggs had brought along another individual, defendant, 
whom she introduced as her cousin. R134:171-72. Ms. Briggs said that her cousin 
needed a ride up to Huntsville. R134:172. She suggested that they travel in her car. 
R134:173. 
"When reviewing a jury verdict, [the appellate court] recite[s] the facts in the 
light most favorable to that verdict/7 State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ^ 3,144 P.3d 1152. 
3 
Mr. Barlow, however, offered to drive his van, and Ms. Briggs agreed. 
R134:174. As Mr. Barlow started to climb inside the van, he felt a hand on his 
shoulder and a sharp point in his back. Id. Defendant said to him, "One wrong 
move, you're going to get this jammed up in you." R134:175. Defendant had a knife 
in his hand. R134176. 
Defendant opened the passenger door lock for Ms. Briggs and told Mr. 
Barlow to give him his keys, wallet, and phone. Id. Defendant had Mr. Barlow sit 
on a metal folding chair between the driver's and passenger's seats. R134:175. 
Steering with his left hand and holding the knife to Mr. Barlow's back with his right 
hand, defendant drove up Ogden Canyon. R134:177-78. While traveling, defendant 
and Ms. Briggs threatened Mr. Barlow. R134:180. 
After arriving in Huntsville, defendant and Ms. Briggs took the road going 
north on the east side of the reservoir, then drove east on 9500 or 9800 East to where 
it connected with State Road 39. R134:181. At that juncture, Ms. Briggs threw Mr. 
Barlow's cell phone out the window. Id. At approximately mile marker 33.2, they 
turned onto a dirt road and proceeded another 100 to 120 yards. R134:183. During 
the drive, Ms. Briggs tied Mr. Barlow's hands with a "hoody string." R134:1S5. 
They stopped and had Mr. Barlow walk twenty feet or so into the woods. 
R134:184. Defendant took a roll of soldering wire and tied Mr. Barlow to a tree. 
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R134:185. Defendant and Ms. Briggs then jumped into the van and drove off. 
R134187-88. Almost immediately, Mr. Barlow heard a loud bang. R134:188. 
After only a couple of minutes, Mr. Barlow loosed himself from the tree and 
ran down the canyon. R134:188-89. Running down the road, he saw where a large 
boulder had been ripped out of the dirt road and had been dragged ten to fifteen 
feet. R134:189. Transmission fluid was all over the place. Id. The fluid led back to 
State Road 39, where Mr. Barlow saw the van "kind of banked off the side of the 
road/ ' Id. He could see defendant and Ms. Briggs farther down the road, climbing 
into a white Ford pickup. R134:190. 
Mr. Barlow later flagged down a Suburban on State Road 39. R134:191-92. 
The occupants offered to contact the county sheriffs office as soon as they had cell 
phone service. R134:192. A deputy arrived within twenty minutes. Id. Mr. Barlow 
told him what had happened and showed the deputy "probably close to 20 pretty 
good-sized scratch marks" and "a couple of puncture marks which were deeper 
than scratches" that had been made by the knife. R134:212. The detective also saw 
redlines on Mr. Barlow's wrists that were "consistent with soldering wire" and red 
stripes all the way around his wrists. R134:213. 
Mr. Barlow pointed the deputy to an empty solder roll. R134:192. Mr. Barlow 
and the deputy located Mr. Barlow's cell phone at the corner of 9500 East and State 
5 
Road 39. R134:193. Mr. Barlow's wallet was later found and returned. R134:194. 
Only his cash was missing. Id. 
Detective Dewain Sorenson subsequently took defendant into custody. 
R135:92. Defendant's grandfather and aunt were present. Id. Defendant said to 
them, "I've done something stupid, I'm going away." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant cannot show plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel 
because the evidence sufficed to support his conviction. Because the evidence 
sufficed, the trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte entering a motion to 
dismiss at the close of the State's evidence. Moreover, because the evidence 
sufficed, defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss. 
The evidence sufficed to show robbery. The evidence showed that defendant 
used a knife to take the victim's wallet, keys, and cell phone from him. This was 
enough to show that he took the items by means of force or fear. Because the knife 
was a dangerous weapon, the evidence also sufficed to show aggravated robbery. 
The evidence also sufficed to show kidnapping. The evidence showed that 
defendant used a knife to detain the victim long enough to travel from the mouth of 
Ogden Canyon to Huntsville and beyond. This was sufficient to show that 
defendant restrained the victim against his will for a substantial period of time or 
moved him a substantial distance as required by the kidnapping statute. Evidence 
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that defendant used a knife sufficed to show that defendant used a dangerous 
weapon in the course of the kidnapping and thus sufficed to show aggravated 
kidnapping. Moreover, the evidence showed that defendant transported the victim 
with the intent to facilitate the commission or flight after the commission of the 
robbery. Thus, the evidence also sufficed to show aggravated kidnapping. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR, LET ALONE PLAINLY ERR, WHEN IT DID NOT SUA 
SPONTE ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient "to prove that the 
Defendant took or attempted to take Mr. Barlow's personal property at all, much 
less against his will/7 and that it was therefore insufficient to prove robbery or 
aggravated robbery. Br. Appellant at 23. As support, he states that "[t]he wallet 
was not found in the Defendant's possession/7 Id. He also claims that "the State 
failed to prove that there was a dangerous weapon involved." Id. As support, he 
argues that "[t]he investigators did not recover a knife nor did they offer evidence 
that the scratches on Mr. Barlow's left side were caused by a knife." Id. Finally, 
defendant claims that "the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant took or attempted to take an operable vehicle." Id. As support, 
7 
defendant claims that "Mr. Barlow testified that he volunteered his vehicle for the 
drive up the canyon/' Id. 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove kidnapping 
or aggravated kidnapping. Br. Appellant at 24. Specifically, he claims that "[t]he 
State did not show that [he] detained or restrained the victim for any substantial 
period of time or in circumstances exposing the victim to the risk of bodily injury." 
Id. He claims that "Mr. Barlow volunteered the use of his vehicle for the drive up 
the canyon and voluntarily entered the vehicle for the drive/' and that, in any event, 
"[t]he State did not show that the Defendant moved Mr. Barlow any substantial 
distance." Br. Appellant at 25. Again, he claims that "the State failed to prove that 
the Defendant possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon," or to 
"prove that the Defendant acted with the intent to facilitate the commission or flight 
after commission of a felony or to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a 
felony." Id. 
Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim because he has not shown 
that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. 
Relevant law. When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a 
motion for directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the party moved against." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, ^ 7, 105 P.3d 951 
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(quotation and citation omitted). The Court then "appl[ies] the same standard used 
when reviewing a jury verdict/' State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 41, 70 P.3d 111. 
The trial court's decision will be affirmed if "some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,129,84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted). 
Where no motion is made, but the claim is that the trial court plainly erred for 
not sua sponte directing a verdict, an appellant must show "'first that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime [s] charged and second that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury.'" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, If 32,55 P.3d 1131, 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117,10 P.3d 346). 
A. In its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of aggravated 
robbery had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To prove robbery, the State must prove that a defendant "unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force 
9 
or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or 
temporarily of the personal property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301.2 
To prove aggravated robbery, the State must, in addition, prove that in the 
course of committing the robbery the person "uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon" or "causes serious bodily injury upon another" or "takes or attempts to 
take an operable motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. A "dangerous 
weapon" is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601. 
Here, the State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of robbery had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The State 
presented evidence to meet these elements primarily through the testimony of the 
2
 Alternatively, a person commits robbery if "the person intentionally or 
knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation." Id. An act is "in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation" if it occurs "in the course of an 
attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation," "in the commission of theft or 
wrongful appropriation," or "in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission." Id. The State also presented evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably have found defendant guilty of both robbery and aggravated robbery 
under this definition. Defendant wrongfully appropriated defendant's keys, wallet, 
and cell phone. See R134:176. He also wrongfully appropriated defendant's auto. 
See R134:175-78,180. Defendant intentionally or knowingly used force or fear in the 
course of committing the wrongful appropriations and in the immediate flight after 
committing the wrongful appropriation. See R134:175-80. 
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victim, Mr. Barlow. Mr. Barlow testified that the Defendant ordered him to 
surrender his key, wallet, and phone at knife-point. R134:176. Mr. Barlow also 
testified that $210 was taken from his wallet. R134:194. The wallet was found on 
the property of Steve Stefaniak, a place where Mr. Barlow had never been, but 
where the Defendant went after robbing Mr. Barlow. R135:40-43,46-47. Mr. Barlow 
also testified that defendant took the van, a then-operable vehicle, during the 
commission of the robbery and during the immediate flight after the robbery. 
R134:175-85, 187-88. This is evidence that defendant intentionally took personal 
property from Mr. Barlow against his will by means of force or fear and with intent 
to deprive Mr. Barlow permanently or temporarily of this property. It is evidence 
sufficient to prove robbery. 
The State also presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the offense was aggravated robbery. Mr. Barlow testified that defendant held a 
knife during the entire trip. R134:175-85. As explained, he also testified that 
defendant took and drove his van, first to transport defendant to a place where he 
could demand the wallet and cell phone and second to get away after the robbery 
had been committed. R134:175-76,187-88. This is evidence that defendant used or 
threatened the use of a dangerous weapon and that he took an operable vehicle 
during the commission of the robbery or in the immediate flight after the 
commission of the robbery. It is thus evidence of aggravated robbery. 
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B. In its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
To prove kidnapping, the State must prove that an "actor intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the victim . . . detains or 
restrains the victim for any substantial period of time" or "detains or restrains the 
victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily injury" or "moves the 
victim any substantial distance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. To prove aggravated 
kidnapping, the State must, in addition, prove that the actor "possesses, uses, or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon," as defined above, or "acts with intent to 
facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony" or "to hinder or delay the discovery of or 
reporting of a felony" or "to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601. 
Here, the State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of kidnapping had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Again, the State presented evidence to meet these elements primarily through the 
testimony of the victim, Mr. Barlow. Mr. Barlow testified that defendant and his 
accomplice tied Mr. Barlow's hands together at knife-point. R134:185-86. Mr. Barlow 
further testified that defendant transported him from the restaurant at the mouth of 
Ogden Canyon where they first met, R134:169-71, through Ogden Canyon, 
12 
R134:177, and past the Huntsville area, R134:181-82. While traveling, the Defendant 
kept the knife pressed to Mr. Barlow's back. R134:178-79. Once the Defendant 
reached the area of mile-marker 33.2, he ordered Mr. Barlow from the vehicle and 
used soldering wire to tie him to a tree some distance off the main road and out of 
sight. R134:183-87. 
Moreover, Deputy Oge of the Weber County Sheriffs Office testified that 
when he first found Mr. Barlow after the incident, he had red and white stripes on 
his wrists, marks consistent with being bound with soldering wire. R134:213. The 
State also presented a picture showing the same marks, though lighter, because the 
picture was taken some time later. R134:218-20. 
This evidence presented during the State's case-in-chief shows that the 
Defendant intentionally and knowingly, without the authority of law, and against 
the will of Mr. Barlow, committed the above acts. Moreover, these acts were 
" n o t . . . slight, inconsequential[,] and merely incidentar to the robbery, were not 
inherent in the nature of the robbery, and had "some significance independent of" 
the robbery in that they made the robbery "substantially easier of commission" and 
"substantially lessen[ed] the risk of detection." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT10, f^ 19, 
994 P.2d 1243. These acts detained the victim for a substantial amount of time and 
moved him the substantial distance from the mouth of Ogden Canyon through 
Huntsville and on to mile-marker 33.2. Much shorter time periods and distances 
13 
have been held substantial enough to prove kidnapping. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 2006 
UT 5, \ 34,128 P.3d 1179 (dragging victim across the highway sufficient to support 
kidnapping charge). In addition, leaving Mr. Barlow tied to a tree exposed him to 
risk of bodily injury. Consequently, the State met its burden of providing evidence 
for each element of the crime of kidnapping. 
In addition, the State presented evidence sufficient to prove aggravated 
kidnapping. The State presented evidence to show that in the course of comrnitting 
the kidnapping defendant possessed a dangerous weapon and that he acted with 
the intent to facilitate the commission of a robbery and flight after the commission of 
the robbery. R134:175-86. The State also presented testimony that defendant took 
Mr. Barlow's wallet while he was held in the van and then tied Mr. Barlow to a tree 
immediately before fleeing. R134:176,185. The evidence was sufficient to show that 
defendant used a dangerous weapon and also that he detained Mr. Barlow to 
facilitate the commission of the robbery, a felony, and to facilitate his flight 
following the commission of the robbery. Thus the evidence sufficed to support 
defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping. 
C. Defendant's insufficiency claims are without support. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove robbery because 
no wallet was found. Br. Appellant at 23. But Mr. Barlow testified that 
defendant took the wallet from him at knifepoint. R134:175-76. That testimony 
14 
sufficed to show aggravated robbery. It was not necessary to show that the 
investigators recovered the knife. 
Defendant also claims that the State failed to prove that defendant took an 
operable vehicle because Mr. Barlow volunteered to drive up the canyon. Br. 
Appellant at 25. Mr. Barlow testified that he volunteered to drive up the canyon, 
but that before he could voluntarily begin the drive, defendant pressed a knife 
against his back, forced him into a folding chair inside the van, and took control of 
the car, driving it to the woods where he tied Mr. Barton to the tree and then drove 
away. R134:174-76, 181, 185-88. That testimony sufficed to show aggravated 
robbery. Defendant, by using his knife to take control of the van, prevented the 
voluntary drive Mr. Barton had proposed and took Mr. Barton's operable vehicle 
from him. 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove kidnapping 
or aggravated kidnapping. Br. Appellant at 24. Specifically, he claims that the State 
did now show that Mr. Barton was detained for any substantial period of time or 
transported any substantial distance or that the circumstances exposed Mr. Barton 
to any risk of bodily injury. Id. But Mr. Barton testified that defendant drove him 
from the mouth of Ogden Canyon to Huntsville and beyond. R134:177-85. He also 
testified that defendant left him tied to a tree, alone in the woods. R134:185. This 
testimony sufficed to prove that defendant detained him for a substantial period of 
15 
time, moved him a substantial distance, or restrained him in circumstances exposing 
him to the risk of bodily injury. This was evidence of time and distance that was 
more than "slight, inconsequential[,] and merely incidental to" the robbery and thus 
sufficient to show kidnapping. See Finlayson, 2000 UT10, f^ 23. 
Defendant also claims that "Mr. Barlow volunteered the use of his vehicle and 
voluntarily entered the vehicle for the drive/7 and that the State failed to prove that 
defendant used a dangerous weapon. Br. Appellant at 25. Mr. Barlow, however, 
testified that while he had offered to drive the group in his van, defendant pressed a 
knife into his back as he began to enter the van and threatened him with that knife. 
R134:175-76. He also testified that defendant took his keys, wallet, and phone from 
him and commandeered the van. R134:l75. That sufficed to show that Mr. Barton 
was transported against his will and that defendant used a dangerous weapon in 
the course of committing the kidnapping. It thus sufficed to support defendant's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
D. Because the evidence sufficed, defendant has not shown that 
the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, for not sua sponte 
entering a directed verdict. 
Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim. Defendant has not shown 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, let alone "that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
16 
submitting the case to the jury/ ' Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 32 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
II. 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID 
NOT PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY FOR NOT REQUESTING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant also claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively for not 
moving for a directed verdict. Br. Appellant at 16-25. 
Relevant law. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
establish both prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which 
holds that such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); see 
also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). A defendant's burden is 
extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can "succeed[ ] only when no 
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and quotations 
omitted). Moreover, counsel is not deficient for not making futile motions. 
Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does 
not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Wliittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34,989 P.2d 52. 
17 
Here, as explained under Point I, the State presented evidence sufficient to 
support a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. Because the evidence sufficed, 
defendant cannot show that counsel performed deficiently for not moving for a 
directed verdict. Counsel is not required to make futile motions. See id. Moreover, 
because the evidence sufficed, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced. He 
cannot show that, had counsel moved for a directed verdict, the court would have 
granted it or that the outcome would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted March V ,2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
E B. INOUYE 
nt Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum 
Utah Code Section 76-1-601 Page 1 of2 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATUREHome | Site Map \ Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | S 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a 
criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item. 
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
(f) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) 
through (h); or 
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if 
committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) 
through (i). 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the 
actor is capable of acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion 
or control over tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious 
bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_01_060100.htm 3/2/2009 
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disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information 
or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Amended by Chapter 339, 2007 General Session 
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATUREHome | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | S 
76-5-301. Kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk 
of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent or 
legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 
14 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is a 
mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
Amended by Chapter 301, 2001 General Session 
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATUREHome | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | S 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 
in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; 
or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, 
Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 
years and which may be for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier 
of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated 
kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission 
of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a 
grievous sexual offense. 
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds 
that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the 
interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court 
may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b): 
(i) ten years and which may be for life; or 
(ii) six years and which may be for life. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm776_05_030200.htm •xnnnria 
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under Subsection (3)(c). 
(6) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
Amended by Chapter 339, 2007 General Session 
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76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive 
the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_06_03020Q.ZIP 1,880 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this TitlejAII Titles]Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Friday, December 12, 2008 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_06_030200.htm O t<-\ f\r\r\r\ 
